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ESSAY 
Preemption and Commandeering 
Without Congress 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen* 
Abstract. In a time of polarization, states may introduce salutary pluralism into an 
executive-dominated regime. With partisan divisions sidelining Congress, states are at 
once principal implementers and principal opponents of presidential policies. As 
polarization makes states more central to national policymaking, however, it also poses 
new threats to their ability to act. This Essay cautions against recent efforts to preempt 
state control over state officials and to require states to follow other states’ policies, using 
sanctuary jurisdictions and the pending federal Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act as 
examples. 
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. My thanks to Olati Johnson, Gillian Metzger,
and David Pozen; to the editors of the Stanford Law Review; and to students in Columbia’s
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Contemporary political polarization has marginalized Congress in shaping 
domestic policy. Hyperpartisanship yields gridlock, particularly though not 
exclusively under conditions of divided government, and “gridlock makes 
alternative modes of policy making more attractive by shifting power away 
from Congress and toward the president and courts.”1 Accounts of the Obama 
and Trump Administrations are rife with claims of unilateral executive action, 
sometimes but not always checked by the federal judiciary.  
These accounts tend to ignore the states. Although “the inability to get 
policy through Congress leads presidents to engage in unilateral action,”2 such 
action is often not so much truly unilateral as joined with state action. When 
presidents want to achieve durable policy change without Congress, they work 
together with ideologically aligned states. And as they do so, they are resisted 
by ideologically opposed states. In an age of polarization, states are at once 
principal implementers and leading opponents of federal executive policy. 
Many executive orders, rules, guidance documents, and enforcement decisions 
are thus better regarded as multilateral, not unilateral, undertakings.  
Consider, for instance, one of the most salient and controversial issues in 
U.S. politics today: immigration. From seeking to strip funding from sanctuary 
jurisdictions, to rescinding Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), to 
increasing raids and arrests, the Trump Administration has acted unilaterally, 
insofar as this means without Congress. But such executive action has 
significantly involved the states. Red states have assisted the federal executive 
branch by mandating cooperation with U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) and enforcing federal immigration laws more stringently 
within their borders. Blue states have been forceful opponents of President 
Trump’s policies, suing to enjoin executive decisions and adopting their own 
laws to furnish protection for undocumented immigrants. These varied state 
policies mean that federal immigration enforcement looks different across the 
country as it is shaped by the interaction of federal executive and state policies. 
It has nearly nothing to do with Congress. 
Drawing on immigration and other domestic policy areas, this Essay 
argues that we should shift much of our focus from the national legislature to 
the fifty states. The “without Congress” descriptor in the title is, of course, 
hyperbolic. Congress retains its powers and might be invigorated by bipartisan 
concerns about President Trump’s autocratic demagoguery (although partisan 
loyalty is thus far eclipsing such concerns). Moreover, Article I of the U.S. 
 
 1. See Nathaniel Persily, Introduction to SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN 
AMERICA 3, 8 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015). 
 2. Id.  
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Constitution looms over all domestic policymaking: Even when Congress does 
not enact a new law, the President and the states alike purport to be advancing 
prior legislative decisions, not flouting or ignoring them. But if we focus on 
Congress at the expense of the states, we miss critical dimensions of 
contemporary national policymaking. 
After describing how states both effectuate and challenge federal executive 
policy, this Essay addresses novel threats to these state roles. Using 
immigration federalism as an example, I ask where preemption stops and 
commandeering begins when the federal government seeks to achieve its ends 
by removing state officials from the state’s control. Looking to proposed 
firearms legislation, I consider federal efforts to displace state law by requiring 
states to defer to other states’ policies. Such attempts to preempt allocations of 
authority within and among the states are inconsistent with core federalism 
principles. They raise particular concerns in an era of polarization when state 
policymaking capacity is critical to national governance. 
I. Partisan, Executive Federalism 
It is a commonplace among scholars of the separation of powers and 
administrative law that the President has eclipsed Congress in setting national 
policy.3 Presidential dominance predates today’s resurgent polarization, but it 
has been fueled by hyperpartisanship that impedes congressional action, 
integrates the President and the administrative apparatus, and renders the 
populace more impatient for presidential results. President Obama sloganized 
(and reinforced) a popular understanding when his “We Can’t Wait” speech 
suggested that the American people should not have to “wait for an 
increasingly dysfunctional Congress to do its job.”4 Although President Trump 
currently enjoys a unified Republican government, he too has embraced 
unilateral executive action. Moreover, even when periods of unified 
government yield substantial legislation, the lengthy, complex statutes that 
 
 3. See generally PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER 
THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an 
Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why 
Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505 (2008); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Presidential Administration and the Traditions of Administrative Law, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1953 (2015). 
 4. See Remarks in Las Vegas, Nevada, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 00787, at 1 (Oct. 24, 
2011), https://perma.cc/KT8V-RPAD; see also Kenneth S. Lowande & Sidney M. Milkis, 
“We Can’t Wait”: Barack Obama, Partisan Polarization and the Administrative Presidency, 12 
FORUM 3, 4 (2014) (arguing that President Obama’s “public celebration of unilateralism 
is emblematic of a far-reaching development within the presidency and American 
politics: the rise of an executive centered party-system”). 
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almost invariably arise—such as those of the first two years of the Obama 
Administration5—demand significant policymaking by the executive branch 
with little hope of congressional revision.6  
The same political polarization that has fueled executive unilateralism in 
Washington, D.C. has also more thoroughly integrated the states into such 
executive policymaking. Partisan ties extend across the state-federal divide, so 
state and federal officials readily recognize one another as allies, and states may 
furnish policymaking or enforcement capacity or democratic legitimacy that 
federal executive action lacks. Faced with a hostile Congress after his first two 
years in office, President Obama worked with a subset of states to advance 
some of his central policy initiatives, including climate change regulation and 
expanded healthcare coverage. The Trump Administration is now seeking to 
roll back President Obama’s achievements and further its own agenda through 
state-dependent executive action. At the same time, today’s national political 
parties mean that presidents find in statehouses not only allies but also fierce 
partisan opponents. And just as states are in a unique position to facilitate 
executive branch policymaking, they are also well situated to challenge federal 
executive action by filing lawsuits, adopting their own laws, withholding 
administrative cooperation, and more. Recent developments with respect to 
environmental regulation, healthcare, and immigration illustrate these 
dynamics of partisan, executive federalism.7  
A. Environmental Protection 
Despite a particular push at the beginning of the Obama Administration, 
Congress has not adopted legislation to address climate change. The 1970 Clean 
Air Act, most recently amended in 1990, remains the most pertinent federal 
law even though it was passed well before climate change was a national 
 
 5. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 6. See generally Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1 (2014) (considering some consequences of aging statutes for administrative law); 
Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without Congress, 22 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 501 (2015) (considering some consequences of aging statutes and “hyper-
legislation” for administrative law). 
 7. The discussion in this Part builds on and updates my lengthier discussions of the 
partisan and executive-focused nature of contemporary federalism in Jessica Bulman-
Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953, 976-93 (2016) 
[hereinafter Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism], and Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan 
Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1096-108 (2014). 
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concern.8 In response to congressional inaction, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) under President Obama adopted rules concerning greenhouse 
gas emissions, including the Clean Power Plan for power plants and the 
Tailpipe Rule for automobiles.9 In part because these rules relied on the 
sometimes awkwardly fitting Clean Air Act, they were criticized as instances 
of executive branch overreach. But the rules also underscored the role of the 
states in such executive policymaking. Anticipating the Clean Power Plan, 
President Obama instructed the EPA to adopt a regulatory program that 
“direct[ly] engage[d] with States, as they will play a central role in establishing 
and implementing standards for existing power plants.”10 The resulting plan 
was “designed to build on and reinforce progress by states,” including 
California and the northeastern participants in the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI).11 The Clean Power Plan, in turn, established different 
emissions targets for each state, based in part on past state policy choices, and 
gave states a degree of flexibility in determining how to meet those targets.12 
The states fractured in predictable fashion. A group of Republican state 
attorneys general sued the EPA, while Democratic states—as well as some blue 
cities in red states—that were already pursuing their own emissions reduction 
strategies defended the plan.13 The litigation is now being held in abeyance 
following the EPA’s proposal to repeal the plan at President Trump’s urging.14 
In the meantime, however, the EPA Administrator has cited the pending 
 
 8. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 9. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R.  
§§ 60.5700-.5880 (2017)); Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 40 and 49 C.F.R.). 
 10. See Memorandum on Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, 2013 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. NO. 00457, § 1(c)(i) (June 25, 2013), https://perma.cc/J793-Q8P3. 
 11. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,665; see also id. at 64,725, 64,733 n.380. 
 12. See id. at 64,665, 64,736, 64,815, 64,888-89. 
 13. Compare Opening Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues at i, West Virginia v. U.S. 
EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 19, 2016), with Brief for State and Municipal Interve-
nors in Support of Respondents by the State of New York et al. at 36-40, West Virginia, 
No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22, 2016), 2016 WL 1614423. 
 14. See Order, West Virginia, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 1, 2018); Exec. Order No. 13,783,  
§ 4, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,095 (Mar. 31, 2017); Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission 
Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 48,035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017). 
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litigation to instruct states that they need not comply with the federal rule.15 
Governors of states that sued the EPA under President Obama appear happy to 
cooperate with the EPA in undermining the rule.16 But those states that 
supported the federal rule are now preparing to assume a new role: suing the 
Administration to defend the Clean Power Plan.17  
Likely more important, these states are also continuing to pursue the 
emissions reduction strategies contemplated by the Clean Power Plan. Beyond 
the efforts themselves (many of which, like those by the California Air 
Resources Board and RGGI, predate and inform the Clean Power Plan), state 
actors also describe themselves as “taking up the mantle of climate leader-
ship.”18 The mantle is a familiar one; during the George W. Bush Administra-
tion, it was likewise Democratic states that pursued climate change regulation 
while the federal government declined to act.19 These state actions and ensuing 
negotiations between the Obama Administration and state regulators laid 
groundwork for subsequent federal rules.  
Although the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions remains an ongoing 
project, the key actors have stayed consistent for decades: The federal executive 
branch and the states, with the courts as sometimes referee, determine the 
contours of national policy. Congress remains on the sidelines. 
B. Healthcare 
With respect to healthcare, too, negotiations between the federal executive 
branch and the states have critically shaped national policy. In contrast to 
climate change, there is a recent federal law: The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) was enacted in 2010, while Democrats enjoyed 
unified party government.20 Soon after the law’s passage, however, and before 
the Supreme Court rendered its Medicaid expansion optional for states, 
Republicans regained control of the House, putting a legislative response to the 
 
 15. See, e.g., Letter from E. Scott Pruitt, Adm’r, U.S. EPA, to Matt Bevin, Governor of Ky. 
(Mar. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/S45L-FVHP. 
 16. See, e.g., Letter from Greg Abbott, Governor of Tex., et al. to Scott Pruitt, Adm’r, U.S. 
EPA 1 (Apr. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/W6Y3-YPRC. 
 17. See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman on 
Clean Power Plan: I Will Sue to Stop Repeal (Oct. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/7VGW 
-HXUU. 
 18. See States & Tribes, WE ARE STILL IN, https://perma.cc/5ZPT-8WCE (archived May 2, 
2018). 
 19. See, e.g., JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33812, CLIMATE CHANGE: 
ACTION BY STATES TO ADDRESS GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 6-8 (2007).  
 20. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S. Code); see also Congress Profiles: 111th Congress (2009-2011), HIST. ART & ARCHIVES, 
https://perma.cc/2TSR-99J9 (archived May 8, 2018). 
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National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) ruling, as well as 
legislative fixes to the law more generally, off the table.21 For the last five 
years, healthcare policy, like climate change policy, has been shaped principally 
by cooperation and contestation between the federal executive branch and 
different groups of states. 
In particular, under the Obama Administration, 31 states expanded 
Medicaid, while 19 did not.22 The pattern was highly partisan: Blue states 
tended to adopt the expansion, while red states refused.23 Yet negotiations 
between federal and state executives yielded some notable departures from the 
pattern. The Obama Administration approved waivers to facilitate Medicaid 
expansion in states with Republican governors, including Indiana, Iowa, and 
Michigan.24 A degree of federal executive branch deference to state interests 
also yielded several different approaches to health insurance exchanges and to 
the definition of essential benefits under the law.25 Meanwhile, a coalition of 
Republican state attorneys general challenged many aspects of the ACA and its 
implementation (while Democratic states took the federal government’s side).26  
Despite unified Republican government, federal executive action in 
conjunction with the states has remained the principal force transforming the 
law during the Trump Administration. Congress did repeal the individual 
mandate as part of the December 2017 tax law,27 but other legislative efforts to 
repeal or transform the ACA have foundered.28 As the EPA was sending “Dear 
Governor” letters about the Clean Power Plan, however, the Department of 
Health and Human Services was sending its own letters encouraging states to 
 
 21. See Carl Hulse, Taking Control, G.O.P. Overhauls Rules in House, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/6QGV-SZS3; see also Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 
519 (2012). 
 22. See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 
https://perma.cc/W9TU-CZJP (archived May 2, 2018). Maine has since adopted the 
expansion through a November 2017 ballot initiative. Id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id.; see also Shanna Rose, Opting In, Opting Out: The Politics of State Medicaid Expansion, 
13 FORUM 63, 66 tbl.1 (2015). 
 25. See Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism, supra note 7, at 976-79, 995, 1003-05. See 
generally Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Health Care For?, 70 
STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018) (discussing federal-state negotiations around the Medicaid 
expansion and health insurance exchanges). 
 26. Compare, e.g., Brief of the States of Oklahoma et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 1-2, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14-114), 2014 WL 
7463546, with Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Affirmance at 1-2, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2015 WL 412333. 
 27. See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 11081 (2017) (enacted) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A). 
 28. See, e.g., MJ Lee & Lauren Fox, Bruised Republicans Regroup After Obamacare Repeal Fail, 
CNN (updated Sept. 27, 2017, 9:10 AM ET), https://perma.cc/ZA5P-S2D2. 
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seek Medicaid waivers that would depart from the expansion-focused goals of 
the Obama Administration in favor of alternative approaches, such as 
including work requirements as a condition of eligibility.29 The Trump 
Administration granted the first such waiver to Kentucky in January and has 
since approved work requirements in Arkansas, Indiana, and New 
Hampshire.30 It has also approved state innovation waivers for Alaska, 
Minnesota, and Oregon,31 following a separate “Dear Governor” letter.32 In 
addition, the Administration has adopted a rule to further delegate to states 
determinations about essential health benefits. While the Obama Administra-
tion initiated a role for the states by giving them a set of options from which to 
choose, the Trump Administration would give states virtually unconstrained 
choice, including allowing them to adopt other states’ benchmarks as their 
own.33  
As the federal executive branch is seeking to transform healthcare policy 
through state cooperation, it is again being met with opposition from states 
that have emerged as some of the ACA’s leading defenders. For instance, when 
the Trump Administration announced that it would cut off cost-sharing 
payments, Democratic attorneys general for eighteen states and the District of 
Columbia immediately sued.34 States have also challenged two rules that would 
 
 29. See Letter from Thomas E. Price, Sec’y, and Seema Verma, CMS Adm’r, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., to Governor 2 (Mar. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/5Q6Q-3B79 
(“It is our intent to use existing Section 1115 demonstration authority to review and 
approve meritorious innovations that build on the human dignity that comes with 
training, employment and independence.”). 
 30. See MaryBeth Musumeci et al., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Approved Changes 
to Medicaid in Kentucky (2018), https://perma.cc/GYP2-BPLE. Kentucky had 
implemented a traditional Medicaid expansion in 2014 but is now seeking to transform 
its program under Governor Matt Bevin. See id. 
 31. See Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Which States Have Approved and Pending Section 1115 
Medicaid Waivers?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/QU9Q-PVAT 
(to locate, select “View the live page,” then select “Work Requirements” from the drop-
down menu); Section 1332: State Innovation Waivers, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., https://perma.cc/QP4D-EXAU (listing state waivers under section 1332 of the 
ACA, which took effect on January 1, 2017); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2016) (providing 
for waivers for state innovation with respect to health insurance coverage). Hawaii 
received such a waiver on December 30, 2016. See Section 1332: State Innovation Waivers, 
supra. 
 32. Letter from Thomas E. Price, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Governor 
(Mar. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/HK95-CE7X (inviting section 1332 waivers). 
 33. Compare Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and 
Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834, 12,866 (Feb. 25, 2013) (codified as amended at 45 
C.F.R. § 156.100 (2017)), with HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2019, 
83 Fed. Reg. 16,930, 17,068-69 (Apr. 17, 2018) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 156.100, .111). 
 34. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Ex Parte Motion 
for a Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Why a Preliminary 
footnote continued on next page 
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allow employers to exclude contraception from their insurance plans.35 
Moreover, blue states have introduced their own legislation to codify certain 
aspects of the ACA as a matter of state law in the event of repeal.36 For 
healthcare, as for the environment, policy is being dictated by the federal 
executive branch and the states. 
C. Immigration 
Recent immigration policy is strongly associated with unilateral executive 
power. Notwithstanding repeated efforts, Congress has failed to enact 
comprehensive immigration reform in the twenty-first century, and 
presidents have sought to alter immigration policy on their own.37 The Obama 
Administration adopted DACA and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans 
and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA)—programs that would shield 
Dreamers and parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents from 
removal and permit them to work—through Department of Homeland 
Security guidance documents, after President Obama promised to “fix as much 
of our immigration system as I can on my own, without Congress.”38 DAPA 
was enjoined following a lawsuit by Republican states, and President Trump 
has announced the rescission of DACA.39 He has also issued an executive order 
 
Injunction Should Not Issue at 1, California v. Trump, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 
2017) (No. 3:17-cv-05895-VC), 2017 WL 6016003. 
 35. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 1, Massachusetts v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 17-cv-11930-NMG, 2018 WL 1257762 (D. Mass. 
Mar. 12, 2018), 2017 WL 4466414. 
 36. See Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., On Eve of Trump 
Administration, A.G. Schneiderman Introduces Comprehensive Contraception 
Coverage Act—Protecting and Enhancing New Yorkers’ Access to Cost-Free Contra-
ception, Particularly Vital in the Event of an Affordable Care Act Repeal (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/NM7J-GQHP. 
 37. See generally Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law 
Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104 (2015). 
 38. See Remarks on Immigration Reform, 2014 DAILY. COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 00504, at 2 
(June 30, 2014), https://perma.cc/C4FF-TM87; Memorandum from Jeh Charles 
Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., et al. (Nov. 20, 2014), https://perma.cc 
/K89M-RZ4P; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., et al. (June 15, 2012), https://perma.cc/9G5C-6CH5. 
 39. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided 
court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Statement on the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
Policy, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 00609, at 1 (Sept. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc 
/2F7U-VALQ. 
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calling for 10,000 additional immigration officers and purporting to strip 
funding from “sanctuary jurisdictions,” and ICE has increased arrests.40 
Although significant changes in immigration policy have been undertaken 
without Congress, states once again play a critical role. For example, most 
immigration enforcement during the Obama years—as before and since—
depended on collaboration with the states because ICE relies on information in 
their possession. The Obama Administration changed some of the terms of this 
collaboration when it replaced the Secure Communities program with the 
Priority Enforcement Program, in part due to state objections.41 But the 
Priority Enforcement Program continued to propose state-federal cooperation 
in removing convicted felons and others who posed threats to public safety, 
and even states that had denounced Secure Communities worked with ICE on 
these priorities.42 At the same time, the Obama Administration largely 
succeeded in preempting state efforts to enforce federal immigration law in 
aggressive ways that departed from federal executive policy.43  
During the Trump Administration, states and localities have repeatedly 
challenged and thereby reshaped federal executive immigration enforcement 
decisions. They have sued to enjoin an executive order purporting to restrict 
federal funds for sanctuary jurisdictions44 and the Department of Justice’s 
decision to impose new immigration enforcement conditions on certain law 
enforcement grants.45 Democratic state attorneys general have also sued over  
 
 
 40. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, §§ 7, 9, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800-01 (Jan. 30, 2017); U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fiscal Year 2017 ICE 
Enforcement and Removal Operations Report 2 (n.d.), https://perma.cc/N2HB-BTRB. 
 41. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., et al. 2-3 (Nov. 20, 2014), https://perma.cc/MZ9D-YGCS. 
 42. See DHS Releases End of Fiscal Year 2015 Statistics, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 
(Dec. 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/M7EW-B48B (detailing state participation); Priority 
Enforcement Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://perma.cc/5L3M 
-3TRX (last updated June 22, 2017) (comparing the programs). 
 43. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 400-16 (2012) (holding that most of the 
challenged provisions of Arizona’s SB 1070 were preempted). For Arizona’s SB 1070, see 
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. 
Laws 450 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the Arizona Revised Statutes). 
 44. See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1201-02 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 
(enjoining the relevant provision of the executive order), appeal docketed, No. 17-17480 
(9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2017). 
 45. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 1868327, at *1, *15 (7th Cir. 
Apr. 19, 2018) (affirming a preliminary injunction against some of the new conditions 
on a law enforcement grant); City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, No. 17-3894, 2017 WL 
5489476, at *2-4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2017) (granting a preliminary injunction preventing 
the federal government from denying a law enforcement grant to Philadelphia for its 
footnote continued on next page 
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the rescission of DACA as well as over President Trump’s several travel bans.46  
Outside the courts, states continue to adopt their own legislation with 
respect to immigration enforcement. In some jurisdictions, this legislation 
limits the federal executive’s ability to maximally enforce federal immigration 
law, while in others it provides assistance to the federal executive branch. The 
clearest contrast appears in recent laws adopted by California and Texas.47 
Both statutes operate by limiting the discretion of state and local law 
enforcement, but if their tools are similar, their ends are diametrically opposed. 
Texas’s SB 4 requires state and local officials to cooperate with ICE: It prohibits 
localities and universities from adopting policies that would limit the 
enforcement of immigration laws; mandates compliance with ICE’s detainers; 
and imposes harsh penalties, including removal from office and imprisonment, 
for officials who violate the state law.48 California’s SB 54, by contrast, restricts 
state and local cooperation with ICE: It prohibits law enforcement officials 
from assisting federal immigration authorities in many instances, including 
with respect to certain information-sharing requests and detainers; limits the 
use of state resources for immigration enforcement purposes; and emphasizes 
the importance of trust between the immigrant community and government.49 
 
failure to comply with new immigration conditions), appeal docketed, No. 18-01103 (3d 
Cir. Jan. 18, 2018). 
 46. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 755-57, 760 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (affirming a 
district court’s order preliminarily enjoining two sections of President Trump’s second 
travel ban), vacated as moot per curiam, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen,  
Nos. 16-CV-4756 (NGG) (JO) & 17-CV-5288 (NGG) (JO), 2018 WL 834074, at *1-3 
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2018) (preliminarily enjoining the rescission of DACA), appeal 
docketed, No. 18-488 (2d Cir. Feb. 20, 2018). 
 47. See Act of Oct. 5, 2017, ch. 495, 2017 Cal. Stat. 3733 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7282-
7282.5, 7284-7284.12 (West 2018)); Act of May 7, 2017, ch. 4, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 7 
(codified in scattered sections of the Texas Codes). The United States recently 
challenged portions of California’s law. See Complaint ¶¶ 1-3, 6-7, United States v. 
California, No. 2:18-cv-00490-JAM-KJN (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2018), 2018 WL 1181625. The 
Fifth Circuit largely rejected a challenge to the Texas statute, vacating a district court’s 
preliminary injunction except to the extent that it blocked a provision prohibiting 
officials from endorsing certain immigration policies. See City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 
No. 17-50762, 2018 WL 2121427, at *11, *16 (5th Cir. May 8, 2018). 
 48. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 752.053 (West 2017), invalidated in part by City of El Cenizo, 
2018 WL 2121427); id. § 752.0565; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.251 (West 2017). 
Under Texas law, failure to comply with an immigration detainer is a Class A 
misdemeanor punishable by up to one year of imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE  
§ 39.07(a)-(b) (West 2017); id. § 12.21. 
 49. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7282.5, 7284.2(b)-(c), 7284.6. The statute permits law 
enforcement officers to transfer individuals if they have been convicted of certain 
crimes and to share information when individuals have been convicted of certain 
crimes or the information is available to the public. See id. §§ 7282.5(a), 7284.6(a). 
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These state laws mean that federal immigration enforcement will look 
different in different parts of the country, especially as other jurisdictions also 
adopt disparate approaches. This is not to deny the independent force of federal 
policy: The Trump Administration can increase raids, deport individuals, and 
terrorize families and communities without state or local assistance. But 
uncooperative states and localities make this more difficult while also offering 
an alternative political vision. 
II. Preemption, Commandeering, and the Outsourcing of Coercion 
Across a range of areas, including not only environmental regulation, 
healthcare, and immigration but also education, drug policy, consumer 
protection, and more, the federal executive branch and states together generate 
domestic policy. Given our polarized politics, the ability of states to advance 
different visions of national policy—some of which accord with federal 
executive priorities and some of which oppose them—may introduce salutary 
pluralism into an executive-dominated regime. I have offered the normative 
case elsewhere and do not reprise it here.50 Beginning from the premise that 
there is value to state inputs into national policy, this Part considers some 
doctrinal questions that polarization pushes to the fore, with particular 
attention to novel threats to state initiative and policymaking capacity.  
One such question has already received ample consideration: the power of 
the federal executive branch, rather than Congress, to preempt state law.51 The 
rise of the administrative state over the past century has directed attention to 
preemption that follows from agency regulations, guidance, enforcement 
decisions, and more.52 The Obama Administration’s challenge to Arizona’s  
SB 1070 immigration law, for example, turned in part on the preemptive scope 
of federal executive enforcement decisions.53 The developments explored in 
 
 50. See Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism, supra note 7, at 993-1015. 
 51. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 695, 698-99 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. 
U. L. REV. 727, 774-76 (2008); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-
Forcing” Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2180 (2009); Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 870, 881 (2008). 
 52. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567, 576-78 (2009) (declining to give preemptive 
effect to an agency preamble); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000) 
(granting preemptive effect to a notice and comment rule). 
 53. See, e.g., Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 37, at 133 (arguing that Arizona v. United States, 567 
U.S. 387 (2012), reflects the Court’s view that “federal immigration law consists not 
only of the legislature’s work, . . . but also of the enforcement choices the Executive 
makes”); Roderick M. Hills Jr., Arizona v. United States: The Unitary Executive’s 
Enforcement Discretion as a Limit on Federalism, 2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 189, 202 (“The 
more persuasive basis for Arizona’s preemption holdings was the Court’s structural 
footnote continued on next page 
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this Essay lend force to concerns about executive preemption: If state-federal 
conflict tends to be the basis for preemption, so too is a degree of conflict an 
indicator of healthy executive federalism. Because states may be furnishing 
diverse policy inputs that an absent Congress is not, there are substantial costs 
to allowing the federal executive to dismiss state policymaking outright, 
especially when the executive acts through less public and procedure-laden 
channels than notice and comment rulemaking.  
Much as contemporary disputes may involve questions about the alloca-
tion of authority within the federal government—under what circumstances 
the federal executive branch rather than Congress can displace state law—they 
may also involve questions about the allocation of authority within and among 
the states. Here, preemption meets the prohibition on commandeering, which 
prevents the federal government from compelling states to enact or administer 
federal regulatory programs.54 Commentators have long recognized the 
fraught relationship between preemption and commandeering. The 
prohibition on commandeering follows from structural and normative 
considerations that also attend federal preemption of state law,55 and distinct 
framings may make a given federal law appear merely to be prohibiting a 
conflicting state action (preemption) or instead to be coercing a state to 
undertake a certain activity (commandeering). For example, does the federal 
Controlled Substances Act56 preempt state decisions to legalize marijuana 
 
presumption about the importance of executive discretion in the area of immigration 
law.”). 
 54. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 161, 188 (1992). 
 55. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New 
York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 95-101 (arguing that the distinction 
between preemption and commandeering is poorly justified by values of constitutional 
federalism, including political community and the prevention of tyranny); see also 
Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State 
Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1054-55 (1995) (“Comman-
deering precludes state officials from being directly and exclusively responsive to their 
constituency’s desires, but so does conventional preemption. . . . Prohibiting comman-
deering but not preemption in the name of securing the accountability of state 
government is simply arbitrary.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits 
of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2201-02 (1998) (“Standard 
preemption . . . can obscure the causes of inaction by state officials. . . . Why, then, 
would commandeering be different?”); Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: 
A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1673 (2006) (“[P]reemption generally 
causes a greater compromise of federalism values than does commandeering.”). 
 56. See Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242-84 (1970) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
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under state law, or would recognizing such scope for preemption in fact 
require states to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program?57 
As polarization shifts responsibility for national policymaking onto the 
states, some urgent variants of this preemption/commandeering puzzle turn 
on relationships within and among states themselves: May the federal 
government preempt state laws preventing state officials from carrying out 
federal regulatory programs? And may the federal government preempt state 
laws and policies by requiring states to adopt or enforce other states’ laws and 
policies? 
A. State Control over State Officials 
Questions about commandeering and preemption with respect to state 
officials’ responsibilities have emerged most prominently in the immigration 
context given federal reliance on state and local cooperation. A variety of states 
and cities—colloquially but imprecisely labeled “sanctuary” jurisdictions—have 
imposed restrictions on participation in federal immigration enforcement, 
including limiting officials’ cooperation with detainers and sharing of 
confidential information. The California Values Act, included in SB 54, is a 
prime example.58 In a pending challenge to that law (as well as to two other 
California laws concerning immigration enforcement), the Trump 
Administration has argued that state restrictions on cooperation with ICE 
conflict with federal law and are preempted.59  
As in any preemption dispute, the litigation will turn in part on interpre-
tations of particular federal and state provisions, and the clear statement rule 
 
 57. Compare, e.g., Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 11, Nebraska v. 
Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2014) (No. 144 Original), 2014 WL 7474136 (arguing that 
Colorado’s law legalizing marijuana is preempted because it “affirmatively authorizes 
conduct prohibited by federal law”), with Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: 
Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 1421, 1462 (2009) (arguing that preempting legalization of marijuana under state 
law would amount to proscribed commandeering). 
  The latter appears to be the better answer. Just as this Essay went to print, the Supreme 
Court held that a federal law that had prohibited state authorization and licensing of 
sports gambling violated the anticommandeering rule and rejected the federal 
government’s argument that requiring states to refrain from enacting new legislation 
is meaningfully different from requiring states to enact legislation. See Murphy v. 
NCAA, Nos. 16-476 & 16-477, 2018 WL 2186168, at *13 (U.S. May 14, 2018). 
 58. See California Values Act, ch. 495, § 3, 2017 Cal. Stat. 3733, 3737-41 (codified at CAL. 
GOV’T CODE §§ 7284-7284.12 (West 2018)); supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. 
 59. See Complaint, supra note 47, ¶¶ 51-59. The United States also challenges two statutes 
regulating private employers’ cooperation with federal immigration officials and the 
inspection of immigration detention facilities. See id. ¶¶ 3-5. I do not address those laws 
here. 
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may further limit the need to address constitutional issues.60 But this and other 
challenges to sanctuary policies also implicate broader questions about 
executive preemption and state control over state officials. Is the California 
Values Act preempted, or would the federal executive’s interpretation 
impermissibly compel state participation in federal immigration enforcement? 
Where does preemption stop and commandeering begin when the federal 
government seeks to achieve its ends by interposing itself between a state and 
its officials? 
I should be clear that there is a related issue this discussion brackets: 
Immigration laws like those of California and Texas involve questions of state 
power over their subdivisions as well as state control of state officers. There 
may be compelling reasons, consistent with the values of federalism, to 
recognize local autonomy and perhaps an attendant federal power to free local 
governments from state control.61 The same is not true of state officials and 
state control (or, for that matter, local officials and local control). State 
governance capacity depends on state officials being responsible to state 
government, as the Supreme Court has long recognized in placing the selection 
of state officials and the structuring of state government at the core of state 
power.62  
 
 60. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (“[I]f Congress intends to alter the 
‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,’ it must 
make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’ (quoting 
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)). For example, federal 
provisions governing the sharing of information by state and local officials refer only 
to the transmission of immigration status information; they do not mention the 
collection of such information in the first instance or the transmission of other 
information that the federal government may seek, such as an individual’s date of 
release from custody. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373, 1644 (2016). 
 61. See, e.g., Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 270 (1985) 
(invalidating a state law interfering with local discretion to spend federal funds granted 
directly to localities); Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. 
REV. 1995 (2018) (arguing for greater judicial scrutiny of state preemption of local 
regulation based on the value of local self-government); Roderick M. Hills Jr., Dissecting 
the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ 
Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1205 (1999) (proposing a “presumption of institutional 
autonomy” that would maximize the ability of localities to spend federal funds without 
state supervision). 
 62. See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (“Through the structure of its government, and the 
character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a 
sovereign.”); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (opinion of Black., J.) (“No 
function is more essential to the separate and independent existence of the States and 
their governments than the power to determine within the limits of the Constitution 
the qualifications of their own voters for state, county, and municipal offices and the 
nature of their own machinery for filling local public offices.”); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 
U.S. 548, 570-71 (1900) (“It is obviously essential to the independence of the States, and 
to their peace and tranquility, that their power to prescribe the qualifications of their 
own officers . . . should be exclusive, and free from external interference, except so far 
footnote continued on next page 
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The closest precedent on the question of federal attempts to effectuate a 
federal regulatory program by preempting state control over state officials—a 
New York v. United States commandeering challenge not about radioactive waste 
but instead about immigration63—addresses the relationship between 
preemption and commandeering elliptically. That challenge considered the 
interaction of a New York City executive order, which prohibited city officers 
and employees from transmitting immigration status information to the 
federal government except in certain limited circumstances, and federal 
statutory provisions, which provided that state and local governments “may 
not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from 
sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or 
unlawful, of any individual.”64  
Even as the Second Circuit left open ample space for workarounds (which 
have since been adopted)65 and largely skirted the possibility of an information 
carveout from anticommandeering doctrine,66 it suggested that the city could 
not prohibit voluntary cooperation between its officials and the federal 
government.67 Adopting a familiar, if messy, distinction between federal laws 
that compel state activity (and thereby constitute commandeering) and those 
that merely compel state inactivity (and thereby validly preempt state law), the 
 
as plainly provided by the Constitution of the United States.”); see also New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (“Accountability is thus diminished when, due to 
federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of 
the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.”); Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530-31, 556-57 (1985) (suggesting the 
persistence of certain affirmative limits on federal action affecting the states even 
while overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and the 
“traditional governmental functions” test). See generally Deborah Jones Merritt, The 
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(1988) (locating constitutional protection for state autonomy in the Guarantee Clause, 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, rather than the Tenth Amendment). 
 63. See City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 64. See id. at 31-32, 32 n.3 (quoting Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 642, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-707 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2016))). 
 65. See id. at 36 (suggesting that “a general policy that limits the disclosure of confidential 
information” might not be preempted); N.Y.C. Exec. Order No. 41, § 2 (Sept. 17, 2003), 
https://perma.cc/322G-GNU5 (restricting disclosure of “confidential information”). 
 66. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 917-18 (1997) (noting that statutes that “require 
only the provision of information to the Federal Government . . . do not involve the 
precise issue before us here, which is the forced participation of the States’ executive in 
the actual administration of a federal program”). 
 67. See City of New York, 179 F.3d at 35. 
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court placed the federal law in question on the inactivity side of the line.68 
Given the posture of the case—a facial challenge brought by the city to federal 
law—the court reasoned that it did not have to “locate with precision the line 
between invalid federal measures that seek to impress state and local 
governments into the administration of federal programs and valid federal 
measures that prohibit states from compelling passive resistance to particular 
federal programs.”69 
The Second Circuit’s suggestion that the federal government may prohibit 
states from mandating “passive resistance” to particular federal programs gives 
insufficient consideration to the prohibition on commandeering. As the court 
recognized, the federal provisions at issue were not generally applicable laws; 
they spoke specifically to state and local government activity.70 If the federal 
government may not compel states to participate in federal regulatory 
schemes, and if it may not “circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the 
States’ officers directly,”71 it likewise should not be able to circumvent that 
prohibition by interfering with the state’s control over its officials. Because 
states operate through their officials, the power of the state to decline to carry 
out a federal program entails the power to forbid state officials from carrying 
out that federal program.72 Sometimes the federal government will be entitled 
to require state participation in federal schemes.73 But if it may not require 
 
 68. See id. But see Murphy v. NCAA, Nos. 16-476 & 16-477, 2018 WL 2186168, at *13 (U.S. 
May 14, 2018) (rejecting the activity/inactivity distinction as an “empty” one in 
equating federal laws that compel a state to enact legislation and federal laws that 
prohibit a state from enacting legislation). 
 69. See id. 
 70. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2016) (“[A] Federal, State, or local government entity or official 
may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from 
sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information 
regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individu-
al.”); see Murphy, 2018 WL 2186168, at *16 (“[E]very form of preemption is based on a 
federal law that regulates the conduct of private actors, not the States.”); see also id. at 20 
(“The anticommandeering doctrine does not apply when Congress evenhandedly 
regulates an activity in which both States and private actors engage.”). 
 71. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
 72. Cf. City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, No. 17-3894, 2017 WL 5489476, at *56 (E.D. Pa.  
Nov. 15, 2017) (“[T]his Court declines to rest a preliminary injunction on Tenth 
Amendment grounds, but notes that the effect of Section 1373 compliance may be to 
‘thwart policymakers’ ability to extricate their state or municipality from involvement 
in a federal program.’” (quoting City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 949 
(N.D. Ill. 2017))), appeal docketed, No. 18-1103 (3d Cir. Jan. 18, 2018). See generally Gillian 
E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836 (2015) (proposing a 
constitutional duty to supervise the exercise of governmental power given systemic 
features of administration). 
 73. See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (rejecting an anticommandeering 
challenge to the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XXX, 
108 Stat. 1796, 2099-102 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2016)), because 
footnote continued on next page 
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state participation as such, neither may it require states to allow their 
employees to participate in their official capacities. 
The contrary position—that states may not prevent their officials from 
participating in a federal scheme—ultimately marks less a celebration of 
intergovernmental cooperation74 than skepticism about government. By 
restricting state supervision, this position would treat state officials as free 
agents. Current federal immigration enforcement appears to follow this 
approach: The lifting of Obama-era guidance locates discretion at the level of 
individual ICE agents, so that federal immigration enforcement becomes a 
matter of government power without government responsibility. Even if a 
free-agent policy is permissible at the federal level,75 however, it becomes a 
federalism concern when the federal government forces states to adopt such a 
policy against existing norms of supervision and accountability.  
When states are shaping national policy together with the federal execu-
tive branch, there is particular hazard to undermining their ability to function 
as discrete political communities. As the Chief Justice reasoned in extending 
anticommandeering principles to the Spending Clause context, “The States are 
separate and independent sovereigns. Sometimes they have to act like it.”76 The 
federal government would eliminate states’ ability to “act like it” in a 
fundamental way if it could, over the states’ objection, enlist individual state 
officials in administering its programs. 
B. Horizontal Federalism: “Reciprocity” Without Reciprocity 
As states have grown vital to national policymaking, questions about 
relationships among the states assume new significance as well. Notwithstand-
ing fears of sectionalism, voluntary multistate collaboration may look more 
attractive in the absence of federal legislation.77 At the same time, concerns 
about one state dictating another’s policies may be weightier. Most questions 
 
the generally applicable federal law regulated the states as owners of databases rather 
than sovereigns). 
 74. Cf. City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A system of dual 
sovereignties cannot work without informed, extensive, and cooperative interaction 
of a voluntary nature between sovereign systems for the mutual benefit of each 
system.”). 
 75. But see Metzger, supra note 72, at 1929 (“Precluding prospective and categorical 
articulation of immigration enforcement policy and priorities is tantamount to 
insisting that nonenforcement decisions be made by lower-level officials, a require-
ment as much at odds with constitutional structure as a presidential dispensation 
power.”). 
 76. See Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 579 (2012) (opinion of 
Roberts, C.J.). 
 77. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 432-40 (2018). 
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about unwanted influence of one state’s policy on another’s fall under doctrines 
associated with the dormant Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.78 Federal intervention to favor certain 
states’ policies over others’—without simply adopting those state policies as 
uniform federal law—is exceedingly rare. The fugitive slave laws are the 
glaring example.79  
But the overlap of state and federal governance domains, coupled with a 
Congress that is unable or unwilling to make a variety of difficult policy 
decisions, suggests that national policy might increasingly be made through 
selective privileging of state policies. The federal government has previously 
authorized states to follow particular states’ lead and thereby increase 
regulation above a federal floor; California’s role under the Clean Air Act is the 
paradigmatic example.80 Today, however, there are stirrings of a more 
coercive form of federalism from a federal government that is at least 
rhetorically skeptical of imposing national policy: compelling states to adopt 
other states’ policies as their own.  
When the federal government seeks to regulate not by adopting a federal 
requirement but instead by making some states beholden to others, a different 
variant of the preemption/commandeering puzzle noted above comes into 
view. Does the federal power to preempt state law extend beyond a substantive 
federal law that displaces conflicting state law to a federal requirement that 
states administer the laws of other states? Or would such a requirement 
constitute unlawful coercion, forcing the states to carry out other states’ 
regulatory decisions? How should we classify federal compulsion without 
substantive federal law?  
The most salient example comes from the Concealed Carry Reciprocity 
Act passed by the House of Representatives in December 2017.81 The bill would 
 
 78. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996) (“[A] State may not 
impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the 
tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States.”); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640-43 
(1982) (discussing the dormant Commerce Clause); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 
(“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens 
in the several States.”). 
 79. See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Essay, Federalism and the Double Standard of 
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 1, 75, 121-24 (2001). Unlike the handful of other full faith 
and credit laws Congress has enacted, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) might 
seem to be an example because it privileged a particular substantive position (against 
recognizing same-sex marriage). See Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 
(1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2016)), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584 (2015). But that statute did not require certain states to adhere to other states’ 
policies; it did the opposite, authorizing states to give no effect to other states’ 
recognition of same-sex marriages. See id. 
 80. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7507, 7543(b) (2016). 
 81. H.R. 38, 115th Cong. (as passed by House, Dec. 6, 2017). 
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require states to defer to other states’ more permissive concealed firearms 
policies: In effect, if an individual could carry a concealed firearm in her home 
state, she could do so in any state, regardless of that state’s firearms laws.82 The 
legislation’s titular emphasis on “reciprocity” is thus misleading in suggesting 
mutuality; states are already free to recognize other states’ concealed carry 
permits, and many do so.83 The bill would instead require unwilling states to 
recognize other states’ permits (or in the case of a growing number of 
permitless carry states, decisions to allow the carrying of concealed firearms 
 
 82. The bill provides: 
[S]ubject only to the requirements of this section, a person who is not prohibited by Federal 
law from possessing, transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm, who is carrying a valid 
identification document containing a photograph of the person, and who is carrying a valid 
license or permit which is issued pursuant to the law of a State and which permits the person 
to carry a concealed firearm or is entitled to carry a concealed firearm in the State in which 
the person resides, may possess or carry a concealed handgun (other than a machinegun or 
destructive device) that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, in 
any State that— 
(1) has a statute under which residents of the State may apply for a license or permit to carry a 
concealed firearm; or  
(2) does not prohibit the carrying of concealed firearms by residents of the State for lawful 
purposes. 
  Id. § 101(a). Given that every state allows the carrying of concealed firearms in certain 
circumstances—even though some impose substantial limits on the practice while 
others impose no limits—the bill’s provisions would apply in all fifty states. See 
Concealed Carry: Summary of State Law, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
https://perma.cc/GAS7-GVWE (archived May 14, 2018). 
  The bill might, in fact, extend beyond nonresident concealed carry and purport to 
override state law with respect to states’ own residents as well. Some states issue 
concealed handgun permits to out-of-state applicants, allowing nonresidents to 
lawfully carry concealed handguns in those states (and others that recognize those 
states’ nonresident permits) even if these individuals may not carry in their home 
states. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3112(Q)-(R) (2018), amended by H.R. 2328, 53d 
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2018) (enacted) (to be codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3112); 
see also Joshua Gillem, Top 5 Best Non-resident Concealed Carry Permits, 
CONCEALEDCARRY.COM (Aug. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/F4US-NWLG (describing 
“states where you can get your permit in the mail without actually having to physically 
go, or adhere to strict laws”). The descriptive title of the Concealed Carry Reciprocity 
Act states that it is an act “to provide a means by which nonresidents of a State whose 
residents may carry concealed firearms may also do so in the State,” H.R. 38 (emphasis 
added), suggesting that it applies only to nonresidents and not also to state residents 
who may not lawfully carry under their own state law but who may obtain a permit 
from another state. The text itself, however, is not clear on this point. 
 83. See, e.g., Concealed Weapon License Reciprocity, FLA. DEP’T AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS., 
https://perma.cc/EE63-SK2M (archived May 14, 2018). See generally Gun Laws, NRA-
ILA, https://perma.cc/FA6W-EG6C (archived May 14, 2018) (to locate, select “View the 
live page,” then select “Right to Carry Reciprocity and Recognition” from the “Select 
Law” drop-down menu (capitalization altered)). 
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without any permit).84 While many problems with the proposed legislation lie 
beyond the scope of this Essay, the way in which it purports to use federal 
authority to require states to adhere to other states’ policies warrants attention 
here. The bill’s language is the language of federal preemption (“Notwithstand-
ing any provision of the law of any State or political subdivision thereof . . .”),85 
yet nowhere is there a substantive federal policy that displaces state law. 
Instead, the federal policy is that nonconsenting states must abide by other 
states’ concealed carry determinations.  
It is this outsourcing of coercion to states that explains the apparently 
paradoxical description of proposed federal legislation itself as a form of 
policymaking “without Congress.” It is also this outsourcing that poses 
particular federalism concerns. Departing from common presumptions of 
territoriality,86 the bill would allow states with the most permissive regimes to 
determine policy outside as well as inside their borders. It would impose on 
interstate relations the coercion and interference with political accountability 
that a variety of federalism doctrines police with respect to state-federal 
relations.87  
Insofar as the federal government is not setting a uniform national 
concealed carry policy because of constitutional or political questions about its 
power to do so, the attempted workaround raises its own serious questions 
about the manner in which the federal government may regulate by enlisting 
the states. Indeed, while many unremarkable instances of federal preemption 
also pose concerns about political accountability and related values,88 the 
overriding of state policy with uniform national policy is different from the 
overriding of state policy with other states’ policies. As Chief Justice Marshall 
asked long ago, “Would the people of any one State trust those of another with 
a power to control the most insignificant operations of their State govern-
ment? We know they would not.”89 Although the Concealed Carry Reciprocity 
 
 84. See Katie Zezima, More States Are Allowing People to Carry Concealed Handguns Without a 
Permit, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/X3A7-V82A. 
 85. See H.R. 38, § 101(a). 
 86. See generally Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The 
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992). 
 87. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 577-78 (2012) (opinion of 
Roberts, C.J.) (noting that anticommandeering doctrine and Spending Clause doctrine 
are concerned with protecting the states from federal coercion and maintaining 
political accountability). 
 88. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 89. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). 
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Act would be a federal law, a “confidence”90 problem attends its novel 
delegation of power to some states to control others’ laws.91  
The approach suggested by the concealed carry bill turns salutary practices 
of contemporary federalism upside-down. Across a variety of domains, the 
federal government—and the federal executive branch in particular—has 
looked to the states to supply policymaking initiative. The result is often state-
differentiated national policy: environmental, health, immigration, or other 
policies that are national in scope but vary to some degree by state.92 Although 
this approach is not without its own problems, such state-differentiated 
national policy has the virtue of bringing federalism’s traditional values into 
contact with federal law. The use of federalism to override state decisions 
threatens these very values of diversity, contestation, and political community.  
Conclusion 
With Congress largely on the sidelines, states are becoming ever more 
important to setting domestic policy as they both effectuate and challenge 
federal executive decisions. States’ ability to productively intervene in national 
policymaking is endangered by a variety of forces, including the many that 
plague state democracy. It will be further damaged if doctrines intended to 
preserve space for state initiative yield to novel claims of federal preemption 
that undermine states’ ability “to respond . . . to the initiative of those who seek 
a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times without having to rely solely 
upon the political processes that control a remote central power.”93 We should 
be particularly wary of efforts to preempt state control over state officials and 
to preempt state law with the laws of other states. These practices undermine 
states’ ability to fill in for a missing Congress and to offer a different policy 
vision than the federal executive.  
 
 90. Cf. id. 
 91. Some might resist the language of “delegation.” See, e.g., United States v. Sharpnack, 355 
U.S. 286, 286 (1958) (upholding the Assimilative Crimes Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, 
§ 13, 62 Stat. 683, 686 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2016)), which subjects 
federal enclaves to the criminal law of the states in which they are located). In contrast 
to the “assimilation” at issue in Sharpnack, however, the concealed carry bill would 
apply one state’s policy in another state. It does not represent a congressional decision 
to conform federal law to surrounding state law, but rather a congressional grant of 
power to some states to displace the law of other states within those states’ own 
borders. Moreover, the law would require states to follow other states’ policies even 
though those policies might change in the future. While the practical import of this 
prospectiveness is not especially significant (some states already do not require a 
permit, and there is not a basement below that floor), it underscores the structural 
concern. 
 92. See generally Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism, supra note 7. 
 93. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011). 
